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Public Health vs. Public Health: Balancing
Environmental Concerns with the Need for
Sterile Medical Devices
Jack Brooksbank
In December 2016, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) upgraded the hazard level of a chemical called ethylene
oxide (ETO) from a “probable human carcinogen” to a “human
carcinogen.”1 Less than two years later, the EPA made public
that it had found an elevated risk of cancer in the town of
Willowbrook, Illinois.2 Willowbrook is a village on the outskirts
of Chicago with a population of approximately 8500—and had
been, for decades, the home of an industrial plant that emitted
approximately four thousand to seven thousand pounds of ETO
per year.3 The local reaction was swift and powerful. Citizens
formed an advocacy group to shut down the plant.4 The state
attorney general filed a public nuisance suit against the operator
of the Willowbrook plant: Sterigenics, LLC.5 The Illinois
legislature passed two laws further restricting the use of ETO.6
Because of the new laws, the Illinois EPA overruled the
operating permit Sterigenics needed to run the plant—
temporarily shuttering the facility.7
1. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA/635/R-16/350Fa,
EVALUATION OF THE INHALATION CARCINOGENICITY OF ETHYLENE OXIDE
(2016) [hereinafter EPA 2016].
2. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, LETTER HEALTH CONSULTATION (2018).
3. ILLINOIS EPA, STERIGENICS ANNUAL EMISSION REPORT (2017).
4. See STOP STERIGENICS, https://www.stopsterigenics.com/ (last visited
Apr. 11, 2020).
5. Complaint, People v. Sterigenics, No. 2018CH001329 (Ill. Cir. Ct 2018).
6. Ill. Pub. Act 101-0022, 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9.16 (2019), Ill. Pub. Act
101-0023, 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9.16 (2019).
7. Press Release, Illinois EPA, Illinois EPA Director Seals Portions of
Sterigenics Due to Public Health Hazards from Ethylene Oxide Emissions (Feb.
15,
2019),
https://www2.illinois.gov/IISNews/19717IEPA_Director_Seals_Portions_of_Sterigenics_Press_Release.pdf. The Illinois
EPA issued a “seal order” which, although not technically related to the thencurrent ETO release permit, prevented Sterigenics from using their ETO-based
equipment. Id; see also 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 415/34(b) (2019) (granting the Illinois
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The Illinois EPA eventually issued Sterigenics a new
permit—reducing the allowable emissions at the facility from
eighteen tons per year to just eighty-five pounds per year.8
However, local resistance did not abate. The community
continued to organize in opposition to the company.9 Additional,
stricter legislation regulating the use of ETO was proposed in
the state legislature.10 Resistance to the plant’s reopening was
so fierce that, just ten days after the reissuance of its operating
permit, Sterigenics announced that it was closing the
Willowbrook plant for good.11
While this action seemed like a clear victory for community
organizing in some circles, in others it was ringing alarm bells.
ETO is a clear, colorless gas that binds strongly to DNA
molecules, but does not interact with most metals or plastics. 12
At close to room temperature13 and in the absence of moisture or

EPA the authority to close facilities or seal equipment if the agency finds
“emergency conditions” exist).
8. ILLINOIS EPA, ID 043110AAC, Construction Permit, NESHAP Source
(Sept. 20, 2019).
9. See, e.g., Ted Cox, Stop Sterigenics Rips IEPA ETO Permit, ONE
ILLINOIS (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.oneillinois.com/stories/2019/9/23/stopsterigenics-rips-iepa-permit-on-eto.
10. ILH.B. 3888, 101st Ill. Gen. Assembly (2019) (documenting reaction of
citizen group).
11. Michael Hawthorne, Sterigenics Is Leaving Willowbrook, Eliminating
Key Source of Cancer-Causing Ethylene Oxide in Chicago’s Western Suburbs,
CHI.
TRIBUNE
(Sept.
30,
2019),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/environment/ct-sterigenics-endsethylene-oxide-operation-willowbrook-20190930nkelcjshkbawdhxx2snjk3oaxe-story.html.
12. ALICE N. PARISI & WILLIAM E. YOUNG, Sterilization with Ethylene
Oxide and Other Gases, in DISINFECTION, STERILIZATION, AND PRESERVATION,
580–95 (Seymour S. Block ed., 1991).
13. Most ETO sterilization takes place slightly above room temperature,
between about forty and sixty degrees Celsius. GAMMA INDUSTRY PROCESSING
ALLIANCE, A Comparison of Gamma, E-beam, X-ray and Ethylene Oxide
Technologies for the Industrial Sterilization of Medical Devices and Healthcare
Products 29 (2017), [hereinafter GAMMA INDUSTRY PROCESSING ALLIANCE],
http://iiaglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/White-Paper-ComparisonGamma-Eb-Xray-and-EO-for-Sterilisation.pdf. Steam sterilization, on the other
hand, generally requires elevating the temperature to over 120 degrees Celsius.
William A. Rutala, David J. Weber, & Healthcare Infection Control Practices
Advisory Committee, Guideline for Disinfection and Sterilization in Healthcare
Facilities (2008) 59–60, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (last
updated May 2019).
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radiation,14 ETO is the most widely used sterilizing agent for
medical devices in the country.15 Indeed, for many types of
medical devices, ETO is the only sterilization method currently
available.16 That is what Sterigenics performed at Willowbrook:
it sterilized thousands of medical devices per day, from knee
implants and pacemakers to syringes and surgical kits.17
Sterile medical devices are essential to the functioning of
the American healthcare system, and access to sterile medical
devices saves untold lives.18 But there is not a great deal of
excess sterilization capacity. Almost immediately upon closure
of the plant, private industry groups and the federal government
sounded the alarm about possible device shortages due to the
closing of the Willowbrook plant.19
What could the federal government do in this situation?
Indeed, which part of the federal government would act? The
FDA seems like the obvious choice given the nature of the
problem. But it was changes in environmental law that led to
the Willowbrook plant closimg in the first place, indicating that
perhaps the EPA should be responsible. Given the complex and
overlapping web of federal regulations, if the federal government
decides to get involved, it is not clear which agency should act.

14. Norman E. Sharpless, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, STATEMENT
ON CONCERNS WITH MEDICAL DEVICE AVAILABILITY DUE TO CERTAIN
STERILIZATION FACILITY CLOSURES (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/press-announcements/statement-concerns-medical-device-availabilitydue-certain-sterilization-facility-closures.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. FAQs,
STERIGENICS,
INC.,
https://www.sterigenicswillowbrook.com/faqs (last visited Feb 2, 2020).
18. Pre-sterilization surgeries had a mortality rate of up to forty-five pecent, and even rudimentary sterilization cut that rate to approximately fifteen
percent. Ulrich Tröhler, Statistics and the British controversy about the effects
of Joseph Lister’s system of antisepsis for surgery, 1867–1890, 108 J. R. SOC.
MED. 280 (2015). Modern surgery has an overall mortality rate of around 0.71
percent. Anna Heeney et al., Surgical Mortality - an Analysis of All Deaths
Within a General Surgical Department 12 SURGEON 121 (2014). Given that
there were more than forty-eight million surgical procedures performed in the
United States in 2010 alone, Margaret J. Hall et al., NATIONAL CENTER FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, AMBULATORY SURGERY DATA FROM HOSPITALS AND AMBULATORY SURGERY CENTERS: UNITED STATES, 2010 (February 28, 2017), and
sterile medical devices are used for many procedures outside of surgery, the
number of lives saved by sterilization is enormous.
19. See, e.g., Sharpless, supra note 14.

444

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 21:2

And even if an agency decides to attempt to intervene, it is not
clear what they could actually do.
This Note attempts to determine whether any federal
agencies could intervene to preempt state regulations of ETO.
Part I of this Note introduces the relevant background
information and the various regulatory schemes for ETO use and
describes the general rules of how each statute handles
preemption. Part II then analyzes whether the specific state
regulations restricting the use of ETO for sterilizing medical
devices are preempted under current federal law. This Note
concludes that the balkanization of agency regulation prohibits
agencies from making broad risk-risk balancing decisions
outside their explicit mandate. Agencies should be given this
power to prevent actions taken in one context from spilling over
into another and causing serious consequences. The Clean Air
Act should be amended, restricting the ability of states to pass
regulations absent a preemption waiver from the EPA. This
waiver should then generally be freely given—leaving the
balance of state and federal power practically unchanged, unless
and until the EPA finds that state action is endangering the
public health.
I. BACKGROUND
ETO is the most common sterilizing agent for medical
devices due to its structure and specific reactivity.20 However,
those same properties mean that working with ETO is extremely
dangerous.21 While the effects of long-term ETO exposure are
not well understood, scientists have long known that ETO is
highly toxic—and scientific understanding of the long-term
effects of exposure is growing more robust. Because of the high
toxicity of ETO, it has long been regulated under a variety of
federal statutes, each of which preempts state law to varying
degrees.

20. GAMMA INDUSTRY PROCESSING ALLIANCE, supra note 13 at 28.
21. Dennis W. Lynch et al., Carcinogenic and Toxicologic Effects of Inhaled
Ethylene Oxide and Propylene Oxide in F344 Rats, 76 TOXICOLOGY AND APPLIED
PHARMACOLOGY 69 (1984) (documenting the carcinogenic effects of ETO).
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A. ETO IS THE MOST WIDELY USED STERILANT FOR MEDICAL
DEVICES
ETO is currently the most common method used to sterilize
medical devices before use.22 Currently, just over half of all
medical devices in America are sterilized using ETO23—a total
of approximately 20 billion individual devices per year.24 Devices
sterilized using ETO range from complex devices such as
pacemakers25 to simpler objects that many people may not even
think of as medical devices, such as wound dressings.26
ETO is a small, volatile molecule with the chemical formula
C2H4O.27 At room temperature, ETO is a colorless gas.28 The two
carbon atoms and the oxygen atom form a three-member ring,
making ETO a member of a class of compounds called epoxides.29
Due to the inherent instability of such a small chemical ring,
epoxides are known for being highly reactive.30 ETO is no
exception. ETO degrades quickly when dissolved in water,
having a half-life of just twelve to fourteen days.31 High
concentration skin exposure to ETO may result in chemical
22. GAMMA INDUSTRY PROCESSING ALLIANCE, supra note 13 at 28.
23. Sharpless, supra note 14.
24. Medline, Inc., Facts About Ethylene Oxide, Medical Sterilization and
Medline, https://newsroom.medline.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/EO-OnePager.FINAL_-1.pdf.
25. Thomas C. Crawford et al., Cleaning and Sterilization of Used Cardiac
Implantable Electronic Devices with Process Validation, 3 J. AM. COLLEGE OF
CARDIOLOGY: CLINICAL ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 623, 626 (June 2017).
26. Ethylene Oxide Sterilization for Medical Devices, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION,
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/general-hospital
-devices-and-supplies/ethylene-oxide-sterilization-medical-devices#what (last
visited Feb. 1, 2020) [hereinafter Ethylene Oxide Sterilization for Medical
Devices].
27. PUBCHEM,
Ethylene
Oxide,
https://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/compound/Ethylene-oxide#section=NIOSHAnalytical-Methods (last visited Feb. 1, 2020).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Kathleen M. Morgan et al., Thermochemical Studies of Epoxides and
Related Compounds, 78 J. ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 4303, 4303 (2013) (noting that
epoxides “react readily”).
31. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA/600/8-84-009F, HEALTH
ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT FOR ETHYLENE OXIDE at 1-1 (1985) [hereinafter EPA
1985]. Indeed, the reactivity of ETO means it can be controlled relatively easily:
simply passing the used gas through acidified water causes it to break down
into less volatile compounds. See CR CLEAN AIR GROUP, Ethylene Oxide,
https://www.crcleanair.com/pollutants/ethylene-oxide/ (last visited Jan. 31,
2020) [hereinafter CR CLEAN AIR GROUP].
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burns.32 In addition, it is highly flammable and potentially
explosive.33
Despite the hazards, ETO is widely recommended as a
sterilizing agent for medical devices.34 This is due in part to the
mechanism by which ETO sterilization works. The most common
sterilization methods other than ETO are heat/steam- or
radiation-based.35 These methods are effective at killing
microorganisms, but are often so harsh that they would destroy
the device itself during sterilization.36 ETO, on the other hand,
functions by reacting with DNA molecules, disrupting the
genome of any microorganisms present.37 This allows device
sterilization to proceed at near room temperature, and in the
absence of moisture or radiation. ETO can therefore be used to
sterilize devices that irradiation or heat treatment would
damage. Indeed, for many types of devices, ETO is the only
currently available sterilization method.38
B. THERE ARE CONCERNS OVER THE LONG-TERM TOXICITY OF
ETO
In addition to being highly flammable, and acutely toxic in
high concentrations, scientists and regulators have long
expressed concerns over the health effects of long-term exposure
to ETO.39 After all, the chemical is widely used in the
sterilization industry precisely because of its harmful effects on
DNA. Studies performed on animals demonstrate that ETO has

32. See PUBCHEM, supra note 27.
33. Id.
34. Rutala et al., supra note 13.
35. See GAMMA INDUSTRY PROCESSING ALLIANCE, supra note 13, at 8.
36. For example, many devices contain electronics that are moisturesensitive. Irradiation also causes degradation in many of the types of polymers
and plastics used in medical device manufacturing. See GAMMA INDUSTRY
PROCESSING ALLIANCE, supra note 13, at 28.
37. PARISI & YOUNG, supra note 12.
38. Suzanne B. Schwartz & Elizabeth F. Claverie-Williams, Preventing
Medical Device Shortages by Ensuring Safe and Effective Sterilization in
Manufacturing, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (July 15, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-voices-perspectives-fda-leadership-andexperts/preventing-medical-device-shortages-ensuring-safe-and-effectivesterilization-manufacturing.
39. See, e.g., EPA 1985, supra note 31, at 1-3–1-8.
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significant long-term carcinogenic effects.40 However, scientific
inquiries into the long-term effects of ETO exposure in humans
have long been plagued with a paucity of data, making it difficult
for researchers to draw strong conclusions.41 This is due in large
part to the obvious ethical problems of conducting direct human
studies.42 In 1985, EPA conducted a review of the effects of ETO
exposure.43 The agency concluded that ETO was a “probable
human carcinogen.”44 However, the agency stressed that its
conclusion was based largely on a lack of quality data.45
Beginning in 2011, EPA undertook a second look at the
toxicity of ETO as part of its Integrated Risk Information System
(IRIS) process.46 This reexamination was significantly more
rigorous than the 1985 initial review due to the existence of
additional studies on the effects of ETO performed after 1985.
These included a number of additional animal studies.47 The
most important new data sources, however, were
epidemiological studies linking ETO exposure to several forms
of cancer in workers regularly exposed to ETO.48 Additionally,
the reevaluation used more complete guidelines for assessing the
toxicity of chemicals, developed by the EPA in 2005.49 As a result

40. See, e.g., Lynch et al., supra note 21; H. Dunkelberg, Carcinogenicity of
Ethylene Oxide and 1,2-Propylene Oxide upon Intragastric Administration to
Rats, 46 BRITISH J. CANCER 924 (1982).
41. Cf. R. E. Shore, M. J. Gardner, & B. Pannett, Ethylene Oxide: An
Assessment of the Epidemiological Evidence on Carcinogenicity, 50
OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVTL. MED. 971 (1993) (failing to find a statistically
significant relationship between occupational exposure to ETO and incidences
of cancer).
42. EPA 1985, supra note 31, at 1-7.
43. See generally id.
44. Id. at 1-7.
45. Id.
46. See EPA 2016, supra note 1. IRIS is a comprehensive risk assessment
program run by the EPA to evaluate the risk posed by environmental
contaminants. Basic Information About the Integrated Risk Information
System, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/iris/basicinformation-about-integrated-risk-information-system (last visited Jan. 31,
2020). IRIS studies are multistep affairs, including research of scientific
literature, review by the EPA and other agencies, peer review by scientists, and
the submission of public comments. Id. (navigate to the “IRIS Process” tab).
47. EPA 2016, supra note 1, at 3-20.
48. Id. at 3-14–3-19.
49. EPA, EPA/630/P-03/001F, GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK
ASSESSMENT (2005) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK
ASSESSMENT].
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of the reevaluation, the final report—published in 2016—
upgraded the toxicity of ETO from “probable human carcinogen”
to “human carcinogen.”50 While this classification is solely
informational, and alters no legal requirements,51 the upgraded
threat level brought more attention to the use of ETO. This
prompted further investigation into the effects of ETO release,
resulting in the findings of increased cancer risk that motivated
state lawmakers to further restrict the use of ETO.52
C. THE FEDERAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR ETO DIVIDES
AUTHORITY BETWEEN DIFFERENT AGENCIES AND STATUTES
Due to its high toxicity and widespread use, the federal
government has strictly regulated ETO since at least 1990.53
However, there is no clear central regulatory scheme for the
chemical. Rather, ETO is regulated on a “per context” basis.
Thus at the federal level ETO is governed by at least two
separate agencies under at least three separate statutes: the
EPA under the Clean Air Act54 (CAA); the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act55 (FIFRA); and the FDA under
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act56 (FDCA).57 Each of these
statutes, and the accompanying regulations, deals with ETO use
in different contexts.
i. Regulation by the EPA Under the Clean Air Act
In 1990, Congress, unhappy with what it perceived as a lack
of effective agency action to regulate air pollutants, substantially

2.

50. See EPA 2016, supra note 1, at 1-1.
51. GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 49, at 1-

52. See AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, supra
note 2 (stating that the EPA reexamined the health impact of the Willowbrook
Sterigenics plant in part due to the increase in the threat assessment of ETO).
53. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101–549, Nov. 15, 1990,
104 Stat. 2399.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2018) et seq.
55. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2018) et seq.
56. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2018) et seq.
57. ETO is also governed by myriad state and local regulations. For
example, the CAA allows delegation of a great deal of authority to state actors.
42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2018). This Note focuses on the boundaries of federal
legal authority and regulations. As such, more detail concerning the exact
details of state’s laws falls beyond the scope.
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amended the CAA.58 These amendments increased the power of
the EPA to regulate hazardous air pollutants,59 and additionally
set a schedule requiring the EPA to take action to regulate
hazardous air pollutants.60
Congress set two methods for determining whether a given
chemical is a “hazardous air pollutant” (HAP). First, a chemical
could be listed directly in the statute.61 Second, chemicals can be
designated as a HAP if the EPA finds that the chemical creates
a “human health hazard”62 or would have “adverse
environmental effects.”63 If the EPA finds that a chemical meets
either of those criteria, the EPA may designate it as a HAP
through the rulemaking process.64 ETO is one of the chemicals
listed within the statute itself.65
Once a chemical is designated as a HAP, the EPA
regulations list all of the categories of “major sources” or “area
sources” of that pollutant.66 Once a source category is listed, the
agency must promulgate a National Emission Standard for
Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) for that category.67 Setting
a NESHAP is a two-step technology-based process: first the EPA
sets a regulatory “floor” determined by the best control
technology currently in use, and then it considers whether an

58. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub.L. 101–549, Nov. 15, 1990, 104
Stat. 2399.
59. Id. § 301 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2018)).
60. Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(2), (e) 1990)).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (2018). 189 specific chemicals were included
within the statute. Id.
62. “Human health hazards” include substances “known to be, or may
reasonably be anticipated to be, carcinogenic, mutagenic, teratogenic,
neurotoxic, which cause[s] reproductive dysfunction, or which [are] acutely or
chronically toxic.” Id. § 7412(b)(2).
63. “Adverse environmental effects” is less well-defined, but specifically
mentions effects such as bioaccumulation. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. § 7412(b)(1).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1). A “major source” is a source that “has the
potential” to emit ten or more tons of a single HAP, or twenty-five or more tons
of any combination of HAPs. Id. § 7412(a)(1). Therefore a plant that, operating
at full capacity, would release more than ten tons of a given HAP is a major
source—regardless of whether it was, in fact, ever operated at full capacity. An
“area source” is any stationary source that is not a “major source.” Id. §
7412(a)(2).
67. Id. § 7412(c)(2).
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even higher degree of control would be feasible.68 NESHAPs
must be set at a level the agency determines to be the “maximum
degree of reduction in emissions . . . achievable[,]” taking into
account the costs of achieving such reductions and “any non-air
quality health and environmental impacts.”69 The CAA also sets
minimum requirements for the stringency of these standards.
For example, the standard for new emission sources (that is,
sources constructed after the passage of the statute) must “not
be less stringent than the emission control that is achieved in
practice by the best controlled similar source.”70
The EPA completed this process for ETO in 1994.71 It
designated “sterilization facilities” as a category of pollution
source and set a NESHAP for ETO release from those facilities.72
However, although the EPA sets minimum standards for
HAPs, state actors are the primary enforcers of the CAA. The
CAA invites states to submit a proposed State Implementation
Plan (SIP).73 These plans detail, among other requirements, how
the state’s proposed enforcement mechanisms will ensure
compliance with CAA standards.74 The EPA then reviews the
proposed SIP, and if the EPA is not satisfied that the SIP will
ensure adequate pollution control, may either call for the SIP to
be amended or reject it entirely.75 In the absence of an adequate
SIP, enforcement authority remains with the EPA, which will
implement its own enforcement plan.76 If satisfied, however, the
EPA allows the SIP to go into effect, transferring primary

68. See Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 858 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2).
70. Id. § 7412(d)(3).
71. EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Ethylene Oxide Commercial Sterilization and Fumigation Operations, 59 Fed.
Reg. 62585-01, 62589–601 (Dec. 6, 1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 63.360–.367).
72. 40 C.F.R. §§ 63.360–.368 (2019); see also 40 C.F.R. § 63.10382 (2019)
(in-hospital sterilization).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1).
74. Id. SIPs must also contain enforceable emissions limits and technology
standards for achieving those limits, provide for state monitoring programs to
ensure compliance, demonstrate that local law enforcement will be adequately
funded, require states to periodically report on emissions, detail the models the
state is basing its decisions on, and set up a permitting process that charges
sufficient fees to pay for itself. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(A)–(L).
75. Id. § 7410(k)(1)(B)–(k)(5).
76. Id. § 7410(c)(1).
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enforcement authority to the state.77 The EPA still retains
authority to independently enforce the requirements set forth in
the SIP, even absent state action.78 Although the EPA cannot
force a state to submit an SIP,79 states that fail to do so can be
sanctioned, for example, by the loss of some federal highway
funding.80 Currently, every state has submitted an SIP and been
approved.81 This is not a one-time approval, however. If the EPA
learns of some deficiency later on, or suspects that the state is
not living up to the necessary standards, the EPA must call for
the SIP to be amended to address that concern.82 Failure to
address concerns raised by the EPA can then be grounds for
revocation of state authority.83 The EPA has issued numerous

77. Id. § 7410(k)(3).
78. Id. § 7413.
79. “No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution
simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate.”
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992). This “anticommandeering” principal forbids federal laws from requiring that a state take
responsibility for implementing the federal CAA. See id. at 175 (stating that
federal action that “commandeer[s]” state governments into the service of
federal regulatory purpose is inconsistent with the “Constitution’s division of
authority between federal and state governments”). However, Congress may
use incentives to encourage states to cooperate with a federal program. Id. at
166 (“Our cases have identified a variety of methods, short of outright coercion,
by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program with federal
interests”). For example, “Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of
federal funds.” South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987). These conditions
may not be coercive. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519,
578 (2012) (discussing that a State needs to have a legitimate choice of “whether
to accept the federal conditions in exchange for federal funds”). But, as long as
the conditions do not reach this threshold, Congress can still “induce the States
to adopt policies that the Federal Government itself could not impose.” Id. at
537 (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 205–06).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 7509(a) (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 7410(m); see also 42 U.S.C. §
7509(b) (detailing the allowable sanctions).
81. See 40 C.F.R. Part 52 (listing all current SIPs).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5).
83. Id. § 7410(c)(1)(A).
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SIP calls;84 however, such a call rarely results in full revocation
of state authority.85
ii. Regulation by the EPA Under FIFRA
ETO is also regulated by the EPA as a pesticide under
FIFRA. FIFRA defines “pesticide” as “any substance or mixture
of substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or
mitigating any pest.”86 “Pest” includes “any . . . fungus” and
“any . . . virus, bacteria, or other microorganism.”87 As a
chemical sterilant used to destroy bacteria, ETO meets the
definition.
FIFRA is primarily a registration-based statute. Its central
provision is a prohibition on selling “any pesticide that is not
registered under this [Act].”88 Applicants for registration supply
the agency with their proposed registrations and a full copy of
the proposed labeling.89 The registration will then be granted as
long as the claims are supported by proper data and the labeling
is found to be sufficient.90 However, FIFRA still contains some
controls over how pesticides are used. In addition to labeling, an
applicant must supply the EPA with any controls it deems
necessary.91 The applicant supplies “any directions for its use.”92

84. See, e.g., EPA, FACT SHEET: FINAL RULE—EMISSIONS MONITORING
PROVISIONS IN STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLANS REQUIRED UNDER THE NOX SIP
CALL (Feb. 2019), available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201902/documents/nox_sip_call_update_factsheet.pdf; EPA, STATE PLANS TO
ADDRESS EMISSIONS DURING STARTUP, SHUTDOWN AND MALFUNCTION: FINAL
ACTION ON RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR RULEMAKING, RESTATEMENT OF
POLICY, FINDINGS OF INADEQUACY AND CALL FOR REVISIONS: FACT SHEET (May
22,
2015),
available
at
https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/urbanair/sipstatus/docs/20150522fs.pdf.
85. There are currently eleven Federal Implementation Plans in effect. See
EPA, Basic Information About Air Quality FIPs, https://www.epa.gov/airquality-implementation-plans/basic-information-about-air-quality-fips
(last
visited Apr. 4, 2020) (listing all Federal Implementation Plans currently in
effect). However, they are all relatively limited in scope, covering only portions
of the CAA requirements. Id. For example, the federal government has taken
over authority in Arkansas, but only as relating to interstate emissions of NOx.
40 C.F.R. § 52.184 (2020).
86. 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (2018).
87. Id. § 136(t).
88. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2018).
89. Id. § 136a(c)(1).
90. Id. § 136a(c)(5).
91. Id. § 136a(c)(1)(C) & (E).
92. Id.
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The EPA can also designate the chemical as a “restricted use
pesticide.”93 This chemical may then only be used under the
supervision of a certified pesticide applicator.94
The EPA must also find that the chemical, when used to
perform its “intended function . . . will not generally cause
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.”95 In
determining what constitutes an “unreasonable adverse effect
on the environment,” the EPA must account for “the economic,
social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any
pesticide,” and must “weigh any risks of the pesticide against the
health risks such as the diseases transmitted by the vector to be
controlled by the pesticide.”96
ETO is currently registered under FIFRA for several uses.97
ETO is a general use pesticide, subject to detailed labeling

93. Id. § 136a(c)(1)(E), (d) (differentiating restricted use pesticides from
general use pesticides, which are regulated less stringently).
94. Id. § 136a(d)(1)(C).
95. Id. § 136a(c)(5).
96. Id. § 136(bb).
97. EPA, EPA 738-R-08-003, REREGISTRATION ELIGIBILITY DECISION FOR
ETHYLENE
OXIDE
(Mar.
2008),
available
at
https://archive.epa.gov/pesticides/reregistration/web/pdf/ethylene-oxidered.pdf.
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requirements.98 Firms using ETO for sterilization must provide
all staff with health and safety training.99
iii. Regulation by the FDA Under the FDCA
The FDCA grants the FDA regulatory authority over
medical devices. “Devices” are defined as any “instrument,
apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro
reagent, or other similar or related article” that is “intended for
use in the diagnosis . . . or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease . . . which does not achieve its primary
98. ETO labeling must include a list of appropriate materials for personal
protective equipment, directions for wearing protective equipment, directions
for what to do if users of the chemical are directly exposed, recommendations
for safe handling of the chemical, environmental hazards, information on what
applications the chemical might be used for, risk mitigation steps, and a
reference to EPA regulations governing minimum facility requirements. Id. at
48–54. Many of these directions require that the labeling contain the exact
words chosen by the EPA. Id. For example, all ETO containers must bear a label
stating that “[u]sers should wash hands before eating, drinking, chewing gum,
using tobacco, or using the toilet.” Id. at 52. The required labeling can also be
fairly lengthy. For example, just one of the labels required to be on every ETO
container must state the minimum level of personal protective equipment, and
must read:
All handlers must wear at a minimum:
> Long-sleeved shirt and long pants,
> Shoes plus socks,
> Chemical-resistant gloves, and
> when the ambient ETO concentration is 1 to 50 ppm, full-facepiece
respirator with ETO approved canister, front or back mounted,
> when the ambient ETO concentration is 50 to 2,000 ppm, (1) positive-pressure
supplied-air respirator equipped with full-facepiece, hood, or
helmet; or (2) continuous-flow supplied-air respirator (positive-pressure)
equipped with hood, helmet, or suit,
> when the ambient ETO concentration is >2,000 ppm or unknown (e.g.,
emergency situations), (1) positive-pressure self-contained breathing
apparatus equipped with full-facepiece; or (2) positive-pressure full facepiece
supplied-air respirator equipped with an auxiliary positive-pressure selfcontained breathing apparatus.
When handlers could have eye or skin contact with ETO or ETO
solutions, such as during maintenance and repair, vessel cleaning, or
cleaning up spills, they must wear:
> Chemical-resistant attire, such as an apron, protective suit, or footwear
that protects the area of the body that might contact ETO or ETO
solutions, and
>Face-sealing goggles, a full face shield, or a full-face respirator.
Id. at 49–54.
99. Id. at 8, 24–25.
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intended purposes through chemical action . . . .”100 Critically for
ETO, the definition of “device” includes finished medical devices
as well as “any component, part, or accessory” of a finished
device.101 As a necessary part of the final, sterile device, ETO as
a chemical sterilant is a device “component.” Thus, while a
layman would not generally consider gases to be a “device,” as a
necessary component ETO meets the legal definition of “device.”
This classification grants the the FDA the power to ban the sale
of any devices it deems to be “adulterated.”102 One ground for
determining that a product is adulterated is that it was
manufactured using inadequate quality controls.103
The FDCA does not require the FDA to set specific
manufacturing guidelines. However, the FDA does have direct
authority
to promulgate
regulations
governing
the
manufacturing of medical devices,104 in addition to the
adulteration guidelines. For the most part, the FDA relies on
private industry standards for ETO sterilization.105 These
“voluntary consensus standards” contain model guidelines for
the development and validation of ETO sterilization methods. 106
The FDA has also used its rulemaking authority to set more
specific guidelines where it feels necessary.107

100. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2018).
101. Id.
102. 21 U.S.C. § 351(a).
103. Id.
104. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(f) (2018).
105. See Ethylene Oxide Sterilization for Medical Devices, supra note 26
(“Two voluntary consensus standards . . . describe how to develop, validate, and
control ethylene oxide sterilization processes.”). The two standards are ANSI
AAMI ISO 11135 (2014) and ANSI AAMI ISO 10993-7:2008(R) (2012). Id. See
generally Recognized Consensus Standards, FDA (Dec. 23, 2019),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfStandards/results.cfm?sta
rt_search=1&productcode=&category=Sterility&type=&title=&organization=
&referencenumber=&regulationnumber=&recognitionnumber=&effectivedatef
rom=&effectivedateto=&pagenum=10&sortcolumn=pdd (listing recognized
consensus standards for sterility).
106. Ethylene Oxide Sterilization for Medical Devices, supra note 26.
107. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 880.6100, 880.6860 (2020) (providing performance
standards for different ETO devices).
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D. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW REGULATIONS DIFFER BETWEEN
FEDERAL STATUTES
All three federal regulatory statutes discussed above have
express preemption provisions.108 However, each statute
handles preemption differently. The CAA has a very weak
preemption clause that allows a great deal of leeway for state
action.109 FIFRA has a strong but narrow preemption clause,
preempting all state regulation of only a few types of
requirements.110 And the FDCA has a very robust preemption
clause, but one that is quite context-specific.111
i. The CAA Preempts Only State Standards that Are Less
Strict than Federal Law
Environmental statutes such as the CAA are based upon
“cooperative federalism[:]”112 uniform federal laws address a
number of weaknesses in existing state law, while still providing
a broad role for state action so as to avoid over-extension of
federal power. Federal laws helped to minimize the risk of
“spillover effects” where pollutants emitted in one state
primarily affect another.113 Having one uniform standard also
alleviated the risk of a “race to the bottom,” where in order to
compete with one another for jobs, states eviscerated their
environmental protections.114 However, environmental laws

108. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2018) (FIFRA); 21 U.S.C.§ 360k(a) (2018) (FDCA);
42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2018) (CAA).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 7416.
110. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b); Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 444
(2005).
111. 21 U.S.C.§ 360k(a); cf. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 502 (1996)
(holding that FDCA preemption applies only where the state law is a
requirement on a specific device).
112. See, e.g., Jamie Gibbs Pleune, Do We Cair About Cooperative
Federalism in the Clean Air Act?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 537, 540 (2006) (“The SIPs
established a structure of cooperative federalism that reserved to the states the
ability to meet the NAAQS according to their own policy choices”); Kim Ly,
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences: Overcoming Federal Preemption and Giving the
People a Voice, 29 J. OF THE NAT’L ASS’N OF ADMIN. L. JUDGES 297, 306 n.53
(2006) (“FIFRA encourages cooperation between federal and state in regulating
pesticides.”).
113. Pleune, supra note 112 at 549.
114. Douglas R. Williams, Cooperative Federalism and the Clean Air Act: A
Defense of Minimum Federal Standards, 20 ST. LOUIS PUB. L. REV. 67, 108–110
(2001); Douglas R. Williams, Toward Regional Governance in Environmental
Law, 46 AKRON L. REV. 1047, 1074 (2013).
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ultimately govern what uses of land are allowable, and
“regulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by
local governments.”115 Thus, environmental laws such as the
CAA raise concerns over federal overreach.
When passing the CAA, then, Congress designed the statute
to preserve a central role for the states. The CAA is based on
“cooperative Federal, State, regional, and local programs.”116
States, not the federal government, still have the primary
responsibility for ensuring compliance with CAA standards. 117
Under a system of cooperative federalism, states are given the
first opportunity to regulate, as long as they at least meet the
federal minimum standards.118 States may adopt or enforce “any
standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants,” as
long as they are not “less stringent” than the applicable federal
standards.119 From a purely legal point of view, state
crackdowns on an environmental pollutant are simply business
as usual, and there is nothing the EPA can do to prevent such
state laws coming into effect. However, the CAA does potentially
alter the remedies available. The CAA has been held to preempt
federal common law remedies,120 but the availability of state
common law remedies for activities covered by the CAA remains
uncertain.121
ii. FIFRA Preempts Only State Law Labeling Requirements
FIFRA takes a different approach to respecting state
sovereignty than the CAA. Rather than set broad standards,
with a broad allowance for state action, FIFRA preempts
regulations of a narrow set of requirements. FIFRA strongly
preempts states from enacting their own requirements in certain
areas, such as labeling. The statute provides that a state “shall
not impose . . . any requirements for labeling or packaging in

115. Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(4) (2018).
117. The CAA states that “air pollution prevention . . . and air pollution
control at its source is the primary responsibility of the States and local
governments.” Id. § 7401(a)(3); see also supra, Part I.C.i.
118. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1992)
119. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2018).
120. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011).
121. See generally Scott Gallisdorfer, Clean Air Act Preemption of State
Common Law: Greenhouse Gas Nuisance Claims After AEP v. Connecticut, 99
VA. L. REV. 131 (2013).
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addition to or different from those required under” FIFRA. 122
However, states are expressly allowed to regulate the use or sale
of pesticides that have been registered under FIFRA, as long as
those laws do not impact the labeling of the pesticide.123
Even under this seemingly strict preemption of state law in
labeling, there may still be a role for state common law causes of
action. Courts must engage in a fact-specific inquiry to
determine whether state regulations genuinely impose
requirements that are “in addition to” or “different from” those
required under FIFRA.124 But if the state law requirements are
the same as those under FIFRA, then parties may still be able
to sue under, for example, state law failure-to-warn claims.125
Courts disagree regarding what constitutes uniformity with
federal statutes.126
iii. The FDCA Strongly Preempts State Law Regulation of
Medical Devices
The FDCA expressly preempts any state law regulation of
medical devices that “relate[] to the safety or effectiveness of the
[medical] device,” or otherwise impose a requirement on the
device.127 Courts have held that this language narrows the scope
of federal preemption.128 Similarly to the requirements for
FIFRA discussed above, state law requirements that are
“different from, or in addition to” the federal requirements and
“relate to safety and effectiveness” are preempted.129 However,
“parallel claims”—state law damages for actions that are
already violations of federal law—are not preempted.130

122. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (emphasis added).
123. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) & (b).
124. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 320, 444 (2005).
125. Id.
126. Compare Indian Brand Farms, Inc. v. Novartis Crop Protection Inc.,
617 F.3d 207, 221–25 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that failure to warn claims are
generally not preempted by FIFRA), with In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn
Litigation, 131 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1207–08 (D. Kan. 2015) (holding that failure
to warn claims are preempted under FIFRA).
127. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
128. See generally Lohr, 518 U.S. at 486, 489–90, 496–98 (discussing how
terms like “requirements” and “relating to [] safety and effectiveness” narrow
the scope of preemptable state law).
129. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 321–22 (2008).
130. Id. at 330; see also Bryant v. Medtronic, Inc., 623 F.3d 1200, 1205–07
(8th Cir. 2010).
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The Supreme Court also held that the FDCA does not
preempt state law claims for devices that reach the market
without undergoing a full FDA safety review.131 There are
various pathways that would allow this to happen. The FDCA
divides medical devices into three classes based on risk, with
class I being low-risk devices and class III being high-risk. 132
Class III devices generally require a full pre-market review and
FDA approval before they can be sold.133 However, class I devices
generally do not undergo any premarket review, as they are lowrisk enough that they may be safely regulated with only general,
post-market enforcement.134 Class II devices are between these
two, and a popular pathway to market class II devices is the socalled 510(k) process where a device is shown to be
“substantially equivalent” to an already-approved device.135
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr dealt with a class II device, and held that
such a finding of substantial equivalence did not constitute an
FDA review of its safety; therefore product liability claims for
class II devices were not preempted.136
Some courts have also focused on whether the state law is a
regulation of a specific medical device.137 The FDA has embraced
this approach, promulgating regulations stating that state laws
are preempted “only when the Food and Drug Administration
has established specific counterpart regulations or there are
other specific requirements applicable to a particular device
under the act . . . .”138 The regulation also states that
“requirements of general applicability,” such as “general electric
codes” are not preempted.139 However, the Supreme Court has
criticized this approach, stating that it “add[s] nothing to our
analysis but confusion.”140 The Court focused on the “parallel
claims” analysis,141 and courts since have generally found

131. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 493.
132. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2018).
133. Id. § 360e.
134. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A).
135. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(B).
136. 518 U.S. at 493.
137. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 500; Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1372
(11th Cir. 1999).
138. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d).
139. Id. § 808.1(d)(1).
140. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 329.
141. Id. at 330.
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preemption even if the claim brought could also be brought
against other types of consumer products.142
Additionally, if states would like to promulgate their own
medical device regulations, they can apply to the FDA for a
waiver of federal preemption.143 The FDA will grant a waiver as
long as the state requirement is more strict than otherwise
applicable federal law, the state law does not conflict with
federal law, and the state law is “required by compelling local
conditions.”144 Once granted, the FDA may rescind the waiver
upon making at least one of six possible factual findings.145
These findings include a finding that new federal laws address
the issue the state laws are aimed at, the “compelling local
conditions” no longer exist, or that the state regulation is “no
longer in the best interests of the public health.”146
II. ANALYSIS
Despite the goal of protecting the health of its citizens,
Illinois’ laws restricting ETO could easily have the opposite
effect by causing dangerous medical device shortages.147
However, despite the potentially catastrophic effects on the
public’s access to effective medical treatments, currently there is
most likely nothing the federal government could do to
intervene. Due to the balkanization of federal authority, no
single agency has the power to weigh the positive health impacts
of ETO sterilization against the negative health consequences of
worker and bystander exposure to the chemical.148
The CAA allows states to set their own environmental
standards as long as they are at least as strict as the federal
standards.149
FIFRA
preempts
only
state
labelling

142. See, e.g., Covert v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:08CV447, 2009 WL 2424559, at
*5 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2009); Heisner v. Genzyme Corp., No. 08–C–593, 2009 WL
1210633, at *2–*3 (N.D.Ill. Apr. 30, 2009); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis
Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1161 (D. Minn. 2009); Parker
v. Stryker Corp., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1300–03 (D. Colo. 2008).
143. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(b).
144. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 808.53–.101 (2019) (listing all state waivers
currently in effect, including the District of Columbia).
145. 21 C.F.R. §§ 808.35(b)(1)–(6) (2019).
146. Id.
147. See discussion infra Section II.A.
148. See discussion infra Section II.B.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 7416.
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requirements, not regulations of the use of chemicals.150 While
FDA regulations preempt all state regulations of medical devices
absent an approved waiver,151 state environmental laws likely
do not count as “requirements” for medical devices as they
regulate only environmental release. It is therefore likely that
no federal law preempts the new state-law controls on ETO.
A. STATE REGULATION OF ETHYLENE OXIDE COULD LEAD TO
CRITICAL MEDICAL SHORTAGES AND ENDANGER PUBLIC HEALTH
The current state-level crackdown on the use of ETO has
caused a great deal of alarm. The shutdown of the Willowbrook,
Illinois facility discussed in the introduction section sent
shockwaves throughout the medical industry. Attempts to
further restrict the use of ETO for sterilization have not stopped
with the Willowbrook shutdown. Recent state actions have also
impacted the operations of at least four other sterilization
facilities over concerns about the use of ETO.152 Medical
professionals are increasingly concerned that state
overregulation could cause major device shortages or endanger
the stability of the medical supply chain.153 This instability could
easily spread beyond just ETO, as well. Given the possible
150. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b).
151. 21 U.S.C.§ 360k(a).
152. Ben Brasch, State, Fulton Plant Make Deal to Reduce Ethylene Oxide
Emissions,
ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION
(Jan.
8,
2020),
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/state-fulton-plant-make-deal-reduce-ethyleneoxide-emissions/uOqcQ3tTc2MaeaFkWzstCN/; Maria Fontanazza, Another
ETO Medical Device Sterilizer to Close Due to Environmental Quality Issues,
MEDTECH
INTELLIGENCE
(Apr.
1,
2019),
https://www.medtechintelligence.com/news_article/another-eto-medical-devicesterilizer-to-close-due-to-environmental-quality-issues/; Brenda Goodman &
Andy Miller, Metro Atlanta Sterilizing Plant Shutting Down as Air Tests Begin;
Lawsuit
Challenges
EPD
Deal,
WABE
(Sept.
9,
2019),
https://www.wabe.org/metro-atlanta-sterilizing-plant-shutting-down-as-airtests-begin-lawsuit-challenges-epd-deal/; Conor Hale, Georgia Files Restraining
Order Against BD Sterilization Plant over Ethylene Oxide Leak, FIERCE
BIOTECH
(Oct.
24,
2019
6:25am),
https://www.fiercebiotech.com/medtech/georgia-files-restraining-order-againstbd-sterilization-plant-over-ethylene-oxide-leak;
Press
Release,
VIANT,
https://tribwxmi.files.wordpress.com/2019/03/viant-letter-1.pdf (discussing the
closure of sterilization operations at a Grand Rapids facility due to concerns
surrounding air quality).
153. See, e.g., Fontanazza, supra note 152; David Lim, Ethylene Oxide Plant
Closures Put US on ‘Cusp of a Major Medical Logistical Failure’, MEDTECH
DIVE (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.medtechdive.com/news/ethylene-oxide-plantclosures-place-united-states-on-cusp-major-medical-logistical-failure/566922/.
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overreaction to fears of chemical toxicity, coupled with human
irrationality in the face of uncertainty, these issues could reoccur
with another vital chemical unless a permanent solution is
found.
The FDA has been following the issue closely, and issued a
statement warning of potentially drastic medical device
shortages.154 Numerous industry actors have also sounded the
alarm, stating that the remaining sterilization facilities do not
have the capacity to keep up with demand.155 Indeed, the closure
of the Sterigenics Willowbrook facility has already caused
shortages of some types of devices that used to be processed
there.156
Recent history has also shown the potential fragility of the
medical supply chain in the United States. Puerto Rico
manufactures
approximately
eight
percent
of
the
pharmaceuticals used in the United States, as well as huge
numbers of medical devices.157 Hurricane Maria hit Puerto Rico
in late 2017, causing widespread devastation across the

154. See Sharpless, supra note 14.
155. See, e.g., Lim, supra note 153; MedTech Intelligence Staff, What
Industry Is Saying About Proposed Ethylene Oxide Sterilization Ban, MEDTECH
INTELLIGENCE
(Nov.
8,
2019),
https://www.medtechintelligence.com/news_article/what-industry-is-sayingabout-proposed-ethylene-oxide-sterilization-ban/
(voicing concerns
that
closures could severely impact other sterilization facilities and would “send our
healthcare supply chain into a tailspin . . . ”); ECRI Institute, ECRI Institute
Opposes Proposed Ban of Ethylene Oxide (ETO) Sterilization Operations (Nov.
7,
2019),
https://www.ecri.org/press/ecri-institute-opposes-proposed-banethylene-oxide-sterilization (indicating that ECRI Institute, a non-profit
patient safety organization, opposes a proposed ban on ETO sterilization
operations because it “could result in widespread shortages of sterile medical
devices”).
156. Jeffrey E. Shuren, Dir. CDRH Offices: Office of the Center Director,
FDA, Statement From Jeff Shuren, M.D., Director of the Center for Devices and
Radiological Health, on Agency Efforts to Mitigate Temporary Shortage of
Pediatric Breathing Tubes Due to Recent Closure of Illinois Sterilization
Facility
(Apr.
12,
2019),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/statement-jeff-shuren-md-director-center-devices-andradiological-health-agency-efforts-mitigate.
157. Measured per dollar amount of product. See FDA, SECURING THE
FUTURE FOR PUERTO RICO: RESTORING THE ISLAND’S ROBUST MEDICAL
PRODUCT
MANUFACTURING
SECTOR,
https://www.fda.gov/files/about%20fda/published/Securing-the-Future-forPuerto-Rico—Restoring-the-Island%27s-Robust-Medical-ProductManufacturing-Sector.pdf.
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island.158 Beyond just the effect of the storm on the island,
however, the disruption of the medical manufacturing industry
led to widespread shortages of critical medical supplies across
the United States.159 Some of these shortages lasted for multiple
years.160 And with over fifty percent of medical devices being
sterilized with ETO,161 potential shortages from lack of
sterilization capacity could be severe indeed. Past shortages
have caused the price of scarce supplies to increase up to
tenfold.162 This limits patient access and contributes to the
already skyrocketing price of healthcare.
Nor are such medical supply shortages merely business
problems. Medical shortages have had a long history of
adversely affecting patient care.163 While it is difficult to track
exactly what causes a particular patient outcome, many experts
have commented on the increased risk to patients caused by

158. Amanda Holpuch & Hazar Kilani, Hurricane Maria’s Lasting Impact
on Puerto Rico’s Children Revealed in Report, GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/26/hurricane-maria-puerto-ricoyouth-mental-health-study-report (reporting on long-term effects of Hurricane
Maria, including physical and mental health impacts); Frances Robles, Puerto
Rican Government Acknowledges Hurricane Death Toll of 1,427, N. Y. TIMES
(Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/09/us/puerto-rico-death-tollmaria.html.
159. See, e.g., Katie Thomas & Sheila Kaplan, Hurricane Damage in Puerto
Rico Leads to Fears of Drug Shortages Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/04/health/puerto-rico-hurricane-mariapharmaceutical-manufacturers.html
(describing
the
shortage
of
pharmaceuticals across the United States following a hurricane in Puerto Rico);
Lauren Weber, Hurricane Maria’s Effect on the Health Care Industry Is
Threatening Lives Across the U.S., HUFFPOST (Sept. 20, 2018, 5:45 am),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/iv-bag-drug-shortage-puerto-rico-hurricanemaria_n_5ba1ca16e4b046313fc07a8b (describing the shortage of saline IV bags
following the same hurricane).
160. David Lim, B. Braun Invests $1B in IV Fluid Manufacturing to
Alleviate
Shortages,
MEDTECH
DIVE
(May
15,
2019),
https://www.medtechdive.com/news/b-braun-invests-1b-in-iv-fluidmanufacturing-to-alleviate-shortages/554855/ (reporting that even almost two
years after Hurricane Maria, there are still shortages of IV bags).
161. GAMMA INDUSTRY PROCESSING ALLIANCE, supra note 13, at 9; OSHA,
REGULATORY REVIEW OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION’S ETHYLENE OXIDE STANDARD at II-11, Mar. 2005.
162. See Weber, supra note 159 (describing an ambulance service that has
“had to pay up to 10 times what it normally would for certain medicationinfused saline bags because of the short supply”)
163. Id. (providing one recent example in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria).
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supply shortages.164 For example, the shortages caused by
Hurricane Maria led to many medical providers having to
change how they treated common injuries and illnesses,
increasing health risks as patients received non-standard
care.165 The practice of switching to different treatments itself
went on to create further shortages of the supplies used in the
second-best procedures.166 Other studies of medical shortages
found evidence of severe rationing, where patients were unable
to receive the treatments they needed.167 One study directly
found that the shortage of a critical drug “was significantly
associated with increased mortality among patients . . . .” 168
Past problems with inadequate sterilization have also led to
fatal infections in patients receiving the substandard
replacement devices.169
The potential shortages caused by a lack of sterilization
capacity could be further exacerbated by foibles of human
psychology. People do not always behave rationally when
164. See Andrew Hantel et al., Prevalence and Severity of Rationing During
Drug Shortages, 179 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 710, 710 (2019) (“Hospital
medication shortages in the United States are associated with decreased quality
and/or quantity of life.” (internal citations omitted)); C. Lee Ventola, The Drug
Shortage Crisis in the United States, 36 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 740, 740
(2011) (“[Drug shortages] adversely affect patient care by causing substitution
of safe and effective therapies with alternative treatments; compromising or
delaying medical procedures; or causing medication errors.”).
165. Weber, supra note 159 (explaining that due to the shortages of IV bags,
hospitals and doctors had to deviate from standard medical practice).
166. Id. (“[T]he lack of IV bags led to ‘a large number of downriver
shortages, . . . .’”) (quoting Erin Fox, senior director of the University of Utah’s
drug information services); C. Lee Ventola, supra note 164, at 752 (“[T]he
original shortage causes a decline in the supply of an alternative agent because
of an unexpected increase in demand.”) (internal citation omitted).
167. See C. Lee Ventola, supra note 164, at 750–51.
168. Emily Vail et al., Association Between US Norepinephrine Shortage and
Mortality Among Patients with Septic Shock, 317 JAMA 1433, 1434 (2017).
169. See Chad Terhune, Olympus Told Its U.S. Executives No Broad
Warning About Tainted Medical Scopes Was Needed, Despite Superbug
Outbreaks, L.A. TIMES (July 24, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fiolympus-scopes-emails-20160721-snap-story.html (reporting that “at least
[thirty-five] people at U.S. hospitals have died since 2013 . . . after suffering
infections from contaminated gastrointestinal scopes . . . ”); FDA, Infections
Associated with Reprocessed Duodenoscopes, https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/reprocessing-reusable-medical-devices/infections-associatedreprocessed-duodenoscopes (last updated Aug. 29, 2019) (“[C]ases of [patientto-patient transmission of] infection were occurring despite confirmation that
the users [of duodenoscopes] were following proper manufacturer cleaning and
disinfection or sterilization instructions.”).
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confronted with a crisis.170 Faced with uncertainty and
shortages, organizations and individuals often decide to hoard
resources and over-order supplies in order to create a
stockpile.171 This stockpiling behavior creates a spike in demand
of the scarce resource, contributing to, or even creating, the very
problem that it was meant to alleviate. For example, the UK has
experienced a number of consumer goods shortages, caused
entirely by over-purchasing by consumers worried access might
become limited due to Brexit.172 Coronavirus fears caused such
widespread panic buying that many Australian supermarkets
discussed limiting purchases of toilet paper—a product produced
locally that is, according to many experts, at no risk of any
shortages.173 There have even been a number of drug shortages
caused by rumors of price increases, as hospitals try to stock up
before the potential cost hike.174 This is a particularly likely
scenario given the uncertainty stemming from the lack of
uniform regulations at play with ETO.
The controversy surrounding ETO may expand to include
other chemicals, further endangering the American healthcare
system. There have been several recent instances where
commonly-used chemicals have, upon further study, been found
to be potentially harmful.175 Some of these chemicals also

170. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic
for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208–09
(1973) (discussing the availability heuristic, which is a mental shortcut used in
determining the likelihood of an event based on past experiences; events that
one encounters frequently are viewed as more likely to reoccur than events one
encounters infrequently, even if statistically the infrequent encounters occur
more often).
171. C. Lee Ventola, supra note 164, at 749.
172. Tim Wallace, Panic Buying for Brexit Risks Causing the Very Shortages
Stockpilers
Fear,
Warns
OBR,
TELEGRAPH
(Mar.
19,
2019),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2019/03/19/panic-buying-risks-causingshortages-stockpilers-fear-warns/.
173. Frances Mao, Coronavirus Panic: Why Are People Stockpiling Toilet
Paper?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia51731422.
174. See C. Lee Ventola, supra note 164, at 749.
175. See, e.g., Julia Barrett, Hormone Impact: BPA Linked to Altered Gene
Expression in Humans, 119 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 524 (2011) (BPA); Karen
Duderstadt, Chemicals in Daily Life: Emerging Evidence on the Impact on Child
Health, 26 J. OF PEDIATRIC HEALTH CARE 155 (2012) (BPA); Thit A. Mørck et
al., PFAS Concentrations in Plasma Samples from Danish School Children and
Their Mothers, 129 CHEMOSPHERE 203 (2015) (PFAS).
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engendered a high degree of public scrutiny.176 While many of
these chemicals pose a genuine public health danger, public
reaction has verged on frenzy instead of measured and
constructive dialog. One article discussing BPA, a chemical
previously used in some plastics that had been linked to
potential reproductive issues, used the lurid title “BPA Wrecks
Sex, Fouls Food—and Worse” in an attempt to capture attention
and internet traffic.177 There is now an entire scientific literature
dealing with “chemophobia”—the overreaction to risks
associated with anything described as a “chemical.”178
This propensity to overreaction, coupled with the inherent
toxicity of chemical sterilants, leaves the American medical
industry vulnerable. The medical system needs the ability to
sterilize devices which cannot withstand high temperatures or
prolonged exposure to radiation. Yet any chemical that could
replace ETO would itself need to be toxic enough to destroy
bacteria—and therefore would very likely cause many of the
same side effects, and inspire similar levels of opposition, as
ETO itself. A more thoughtful regulatory response is therefore
required to prevent serious shortages of lifesaving materials.
B. UNDER CURRENT LAW, STATE LAW REGULATIONS OF ETO
ARE LIKELY NOT PREEMPTED
By dividing regulatory authority over ETO into separate
contexts, Congress unwittingly prevented any single agency
from being able to consider the ultimate issue at stake: whether
the benefits to the public health outweigh the harms caused by
ETO use. Current environmental laws such as the CAA are
based upon assessments of the health impact only from the

176. See, e.g., Paula Gardner, Michigan Sues 17 Chemical Companies for
PFAS
Contamination,
MLIVE
(Jan.
14,
2020),
https://www.mlive.com/news/2020/01/michigan-sues-17-chemical-companiesfor-pfas-contamination.html; Michael Hawthorne & Dan Mihalopoulos,
Chicago Sends a Message on BPA, CHI. TRIB. (May 14, 2009),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2009-05-14-0905131100story.html.
177. Elaine Shannon, BPA Wrecks Sex, Fouls Food—and Worse, ENVTL.
WORKING GROUP (Nov. 11, 2009), https://www.ewg.org/kid-safe-chemicals-actblog/2009/11/bpa-ruins-sex-pollutes-food-and-probably-worse/.
178. See, e.g., Susan Billington et al., Covert Approaches to Countering Adult
Chemophobia, 85 J. CHEMICAL EDUC. 379 (2008); Michelle Francl, How to
Counteract Chemophobia, 5 NATURE CHEMISTRY 439 (2013); Gordon Gribble,
Food Chemistry and Chemophobia, 5 FOOD SECURITY 177 (2013).
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release of the pollutant, excluding any consideration of what the
chemical is used for.179 Based on this narrow analytical
foundation, states are given authority to regulate more
strictly.180 The architects of the CAA assumed that stricter
regulations would lead to better health outcomes, and states are
granted the authority to choose to adopt more costly measures,
if they wish.181 Medical device regulations, on the other hand
grant the states far less authority to set their own regulations.182
However, while the FDA can set minimum standards for
compounds all the way up the supply chain, it does not have the
power to assure that a given compound remains available. There
is therefore most likely no formal action that a federal agency
could take to prevent the state-level banning of ETO.
i. State Regulations of ETO Are Likely Not Preempted by EPA
Authority
The CAA is very clear: states can pass their own emission
limits as long as they are more stringent than their federal
equivalents.183 FIFRA is equally clear: state regulations of the
use of pesticides are not preempted.184 States are only forbidden
from passing laws altering the requirements for pesticide
labels.185 State laws banning the use of ETO are more strict than
current federal laws, thus evading CAA preemption. And state
laws ban only the use, and do not add any requirements for the
labeling, thus evading FIFRA preemption. Therefore, neither
the CAA nor FIFRA preempt state law bans on the use of ETO.
ii. State Environmental Laws Are Likely Not Specific Enough
to Devices to Be Preempted Under the FDCA.
The FDCA contains a much stronger preemption clause
than those in the CAA and FIFRA.186 However, that preemption
has been interpreted relatively narrowly, with courts generally
reading it as only applying to laws that directly affect the safety
179. See Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 858 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 7416.
181. Id.
182. 21 U.S.C.§ 360k(a).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 7416.
184. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) & (b).
185. Id. § 136v(b).
186. 21 U.S.C. § 360k.
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or effectiveness of the device.187 State environmental regulations
are therefore likely not specific enough to any given device to
constitute a “requirement” for the device. The FDCA therefore
likely does not preempt such attenuated, indirect effects.
The FDCA does not envision as broad a role for state policies
as environmental statutes generally do. It preempts all state law
requirements for medical devices—regardless of whether they
are stricter than federal law.188 However, the federalism and
state sovereignty concerns motivating the design of
environmental law are still present with device regulations.189
Courts have therefore narrowed the interpretation of the
FDCA’s preemption provisions.190
A partly analogous context may be found in the realm of
product liability cases. Where a consumer brings a product
liability case against a medical device manufacturer, the
manufacturer often raises preemption as a defense.191 The
argument is that because the FDA has certified the device as
safe, state law cannot hold that the device unreasonably caused
injury—i.e. was unsafe.192 Where the product at issue has been
subject to FDA review for safety, courts have found in favor of
preemption.193
Applying this reasoning to the context of environmental
regulations directed at ETO, however, leads to difficulties. First,
preemption under this reasoning would apply only where the
FDA has actually reviewed the device in question; class I and
class II devices may not be covered.194 Even assuming that every
affected facility will process at least some class III devices,
187. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486, 489–90, 496–98 (1996)
(discussing how terms like “requirements” and “relating to [] safety and
effectiveness” narrow the scope of preemptable state law).
188. Id.
189. See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 475 (discussing the broad police powers states
have to protect the health and safety of its citizens) (citing Hillsborough County
v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985)).
190. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 493–94 (holding that “[FDCA’s § 510(k) “substantial
equivalency”] process is focused on equivalence, not safety”) (internal quotations
omitted).
191. See, e.g., id.
192. Id.; Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323 (2008).
193. See, e.g., Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330.
194. Cf. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 493 (holding that common law claims regarding a
class II device are not preempted because there was no actual FDA review of
safety for that specific device).
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however, the analogy still does not hold. For a class III device,
the thing that is reviewed by the FDA is the final, commercially
sold device, not the sterilants used in its manufacture.195 More
directly, while a product liability claim directly contradicts the
FDA certification that the device is safe, an environmental
regulation raises no such issue. A product liability claim (“Device
A is unsafe”) is directly incompatible with the federal law
(“Device A is safe”). However, a law deeming a specific device
safe does not contradict a law preventing the release of a
chemical used in manufacturing that device. A necessary
consequence of banning that release could be that the chemical
is unavailable for use in manufacturing. But the law banning the
release can hardly be said to be a “requirement” on the device.
That the FDCA likely does not preempt state environmental
regulation is further reinforced by the language of the FDCA.
State lawmakers are forbidden from creating requirements
different from those “applicable under this chapter [of the
FDCA].”196 An environmental law requirement could impact the
safety of a device and therefore be construed as applicable under
the FDCA. However, including the language preempting state
requirements that differs from those “applicable under this
chapter [of the FDCA]” shows that the FDCA preempts only
more direct requirements relating to medical devices rather than
indirect impacts from unrelated environmental legislation.
Since a state law banning the release of ETO is most likely not
a “requirement” of the manufacture of any particular medical
device, it would most likely not be preempted by the FDCA.
C. FEDERAL AGENCIES SHOULD HAVE A WAY TO OVERSEE
REGULATION OF NECESSARY HEALTHCARE CHEMICALS LIKE
ETHYLENE OXIDE
States have a strong and legitimate interest in regulating
the quality of their environments. However, sometimes actions
that protect the public health implicate other important health
programs. The use of harsh chemicals to prepare safe medical
devices may have a negative impact on public health,197 but that
impact may be far outweighed by the need for sterile products.
195. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360c(C) (referring to “a device” as a whole, not the
specific contents used in the manufacture such device).
196. Id. § 360k(a)(1).
197. Recall that ETO has been deemed a “human carcinogen.” EPA 2016,
supra note 1.

470

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 21:2

To prevent a situation where every state actor chases purely
local goals at the expense of nationwide public health, the
federal government should have a role to ensure national values
are represented.
One way to look at the problem of ETO sterilization is
through the lens of NIMBY (“not in my backyard”), a sort of
inverse tragedy of the commons.198 In a NIMBY199 situation,
where there is widespread agreement on the importance of a
particular endeavor, and each actor agrees that it needs to be
done somewhere, but each actor wants it to be done somewhere
else.200 When a multitude of different local actors regulate ETO,
each locality has an incentive to strenuously resist the operation
of any sterilization facilities, acting under the belief that some
other locality will allow it. A uniform federal system of
regulations could help to solve this problem, as a national
perspective eliminates the possibility that someone else will do
it. A facility being operated anywhere in the United States would
be subject to the same rules.
Additionally, a uniform regulatory system may alleviate
some causes of the NIMBY reaction. Some academics suggest
that the true cause of the depth of NIMBY feeling is concerns of
fairness.201 “The aim of NIMBY activists and actors can be seen
as not only protesting against planning processes,
but . . . ensuring the legitimacy and acceptability of land-use
198. A tragedy of the commons is where every person agrees there should be
limits on the use of a resource, but are individually better off by not following
any limits, leading to the over-exploitation of the resource to the point of
destruction. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243
(1968) (offering various illustrations of the concept).
199. NIMBY has also been referred to as LULU (“locally unwanted land
uses”), NIABY (“not in anyone’s backyard”), NIMTOO (“not in my term of
office”), BANANA (“build absolutely nothing anywhere near anyone”), NOPE
(“not on planet earth”), and CAVE (“citizens against virtually everything”).
Carissa Schively, Understanding the NIMBY and LULU Phenomena:
Reassessing Our Knowledge Base and Informing Future Research, 21 J. PLAN.
LITERATURE 255 (2007).
200. Patrick Devine-Wright, Explaining “NIMBY” Objections to a Power
Line: The Role of Personal, Place Attachment and Project-Related Factors, 45
ENV. & BEHAV. 761, 763–65 (2012); Renée J. Johnson & Michael J. Scicchitano,
Don’t Call Me NIMBY: Public Attitudes Toward Solid Waste Facilities, 44 ENV.
& BEHAV. 410, 410–12 (2012).
201. Veikko Eranti, Re-Visiting NIMBY: From Conflicting Interests to
Conflicting Valuations, 65 SOC. REV. 285, 286 (2017); Maarten Wolsink, Invalid
Theory Impedes Our Understanding: A Critique on the Persistence of the
Language of NIMBY, 31 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 85 (2006).
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decisions on a larger scale.”202 A federal regulatory scheme
attuned to the actual issue, namely whether the overall health
benefit of ETO use outweighs the hazards of that use, could help
alleviate these concerns. Strong federal controls of ETO use
would ensure that any continuing use of ETO would reflect the
considered expert judgment of a specialized agency. Further, if
local residents become concerned and wish to gain a more
thorough understanding of ETO regulation, a single federal
standard would be much easier to find and understand than an
overlapping collage of local, state, and federal laws and
regulations.
D. AMENDING THE CAA TO INCLUDE FDA-LIKE PREEMPTION
ALLOWS STATE FLEXIBILITY AND WOULD PREVENT SHORTAGES
OF MEDICAL DEVICES
Federal agencies should play a greater role in the uniform
regulation of ETO. Such a change could take many forms. One
promising possibility is a preemption waiver system based on
the existing medical device laws. An FDA-style preemption
system, where states can apply for a waiver of federal
preemption, could balance the interests of state autonomy
versus federal uniformity.203 A waiver system would allow for
state flexibility in setting their own laws, while still allowing the
federal government to intervene if it determined that local
efforts would ultimately cause more harm than good. Lastly,
granting this role to the EPA would make the most sense,
because the EPA is already involved in CAA rulemaking.
Under the current FDCA waiver system, a state may obtain
a waiver as long as the proposed state requirement is stricter
than applicable federal standards, the state law does not directly
conflict with federal law, and the state law is “required by
compelling local conditions.”204 Ordinarily, an environmental
law passed to ensure the safety of the local populace is certainly

202. Eranti, supra note 201, at 287.
203. The current waiver system does already apply to ETO—to the extent
that state laws are currently preempted by the FDCA. As state environmental
laws are most likely not preempted under the FDCA, see supra Section I.D.iii,
statutory change will be necessary to include these types of laws under any
potential preemption waiver scheme.
204. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(b); see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 808.53–.101 (2019) (listing all
state waivers currently in effect).
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“compelling.”205 Under this system, preemption waivers could be
given freely, leaving the state’s inherent powers to protect its
population mostly intact.
The current FDA waiver system allows a revocation of a
granted waiver if the agency makes at least one of several
specified findings.206 Specifically, the FDA can revoke a granted
preemption waiver upon a finding that the state law is “no longer
in the best interests of the public health.”207 Importing this
language to a preemption system under the CAA for chemical
sterilants such as ETO would grant the federal government a
mechanism by which it could intervene to prevent critical
shortages of medical products. It would also prevent too much
federal intrusion into state policymaking. After all, a mere
increase in price would not affect the public health, so increased
regulatory burden alone would not be enough to trigger a
revocation of the state preemption waiver.208 As long as a state
law did not threaten medical device shortages—if, for example,
it were phased in over a long enough period of time that the
supply chain could adapt and ensure uninterrupted
production—states would be free to make whatever local law
choices they desired.
Granting this authority to the EPA would make the most
sense. The state laws that are causing these issues are
environmental statutes, an area of the EPA’s expertise.209
Unlike the FDA, the EPA is already involved in CAA
rulemaking. Taking the time to better understand states’
proposals would therefore be less of a burden. Indeed, due to the
existing CAA preemption provisions,210 the EPA is likely already
well-informed about state environmental laws.

205. Cf. Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. City of League City, Tex., 488 F.3d
613, 622 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that public safety is “a compelling interest at
the heart of government’s function”).
206. 21 C.F.R. § 808.35(b) (2019).
207. Id. § 808.35(b)(6).
208. Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. 457, 466 (2001) (holding that
absent express authorization, agencies may not consider cost in determining if
a proposed regulation advances the public health).
209. Our Mission and What We Do, EPA (Feb. 7, 2018),
https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do (noting that the
EPA works to ensure that federal laws protecting the environment are
administered and enforced fairly).
210. See discussion supra Section I part D(i).
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The EPA already has a long and successful history of riskrisk balancing, like the considerations at issue here between
environmental, health, and safety concerns. For example, the
Safe Drinking Water Act requires the EPA to set standards for
chemical contaminants in drinking water. The EPA first sets a
goal at “the level at which no known or anticipated adverse
effects on the health of persons occur,”211 then sets an
enforceable limit at the level “as close to the maximum
contaminant level goal as is feasible.”212 However, the
enforceable level may be altered if needed to ensure the best
overall drinking water quality—such as if treating a given
contaminant will create more contaminants or interfere with
other steps in water treatment.213 The chlorine that is used to
kill microorganisms in drinking water does leave behind
carcinogenic by-products.214 However, the reduction in mortality
from waterborne diseases associated with chlorinating water
vastly outweighs this risk, so the United States continues to
chlorinate our drinking water—and we are overall much
healthier for it.215
Granting the EPA a general power of preemption in
regulating ETO (and other harmful but seemingly necessary
chemicals), coupled with a freely-granted waiver option, would
enable protection of the public health with minimal disruption
of state autonomy. States would generally remain free to act
however they think best. However, state action would be subject
to federal oversight that could intervene if—but only if—state
action caused a direct threat to the health of the nation.216
211. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)(A) (2018).
212. Id. § 300g-1(b)(4)(B).
213. Id. § 300g-1(b)(5)(A).
214. Ahmed Mahmoud El-Tawil, Colorectal Cancers and Chlorinated Water,
8 WORLD J. GASTROINTESTINAL ONCOLOGY 402 (2016).
215. AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N, WATER CHLORINATION/CHLORAMINATION
PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 2–6 (2d ed. 2006).
216. It is also important to distinguish a number of conclusions that this
Note does not draw. First, this Note does not discuss whether the law should be
changed, and federal regulatory power enlarged, because state law actions may
make sterilizing medical devices more expensive. These kinds of local
cost/benefit calculations are exactly why federal statutes such as the CAA allow
states to enact their own rules, a topic which has been thoroughly debated
elsewhere. Rather, the concern addressed here is the direct health impact that
a shortage of sterile products would cause. Second, this Note does not suggest
what the outcome of further study of ETO sterilization would be. It is entirely
plausible that the harm to workers and communities from the release of ETO
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E. COMPREHENSIVE STATUTORY REFORM IS A BETTER SOLUTION
THAN OFFSHORING THE PRODUCTION OF STERILIZED MEDICAL
DEVICES
Enormous amounts of medical manufacturing is already
done overseas. India currently supplies approximately half of
the world’s vaccines, and produces around forty percent of all
generic drugs consumed in the U.S.217 China meanwhile
produces around thirty percent of the U.S. market for medical
devices218 and ninety-seven percent of the antibiotics used in the
U.S.219 All told, approximately eighty percent of all active
pharmaceutical ingredients used in the U.S. are manufactured
abroad.220 Given these existing trends within the medical
manufacturing industry, it seems likely that if the United States
cannot adequately address how companies can continue to
sterilize medical devices domestically, the result will be that
these functions will be sent offshore. However, exporting these
capabilities in order to avoid U.S. environmental laws raises
serious issues in regard to both ethics and the stability of the
U.S. public health supply chain.
Simply offshoring the capabilities to countries with less
strict environmental regulation raises profound concerns of
environmental justice.221 If we think ETO is too dangerous to
could outweigh the benefits of its use to consumers of sterilized goods. A
potential device shortage could, in theory, adversely affect the health of fewer
people than the continued operation of ETO sterilization facilities. The problem
is not that some analysis has found the use of ETO to be unjustified. The
problem is that, under the current legal structure, no regulator is doing this
analysis.
217. Charlotte Edwards, Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Companies in
India: Ones to Watch, PHARMACEUTICAL TECH. (Aug. 6, 2018),
https://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/features/pharmaceuticalmanufacturing-companies-in-india/.
218. Mihir Torsekar, Pain in the (Supply) Chain: Tariffs and U.S.-China
Medtech Trade, MED. PRODUCTS OUTSOURCING (Apr. 3, 2019),
https://www.mpo-mag.com/issues/2019-04-01/view_columns/pain-in-thesupply-chain-tariffs-and-us-china-medtech-trade/.
219. Yanzhong Huang, U.S. Dependence on Pharmaceutical Products from
China, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Aug.14, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/blog/usdependence-pharmaceutical-products-china.
220. Id.
221. “Environmental Justice” has been described as “the fair treatment and
meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin,
or income, with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement
of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.” Environmental Justice, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice (last visited Mar. 8, 2020).
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work within our communities, why would it be better to ship it
off to have someone else, in a poorer and less-developed nation,
do the same work? Environmental justice advocates have long
raised arguments that the placement of heavily polluting
facilities within poorer communities, often disproportionately
populated by people of color, constitutes “environmental
racism.”222 Especially given the relative ease with which ETO
emissions can be controlled,223 it may be that the most ethical
course of action would be to ensure that sterilization facilities
are kept in the U.S., where they can be subject to more thorough
oversight.
The globalization of the medical supply chain can also have
the unintended consequence of making the public health more
vulnerable to disruptive events. The recent coronavirus
outbreak has shown that public health emergencies can leave
countries without their own production facilities in extremely
precarious situations. As COVID-19 spreads, many countries,
including China and India, have limited or banned the export of
certain medical products.224 Such bans threaten to create further
shortages—including shortages of products not directly related
to the emergency, such as the common painkiller paracetamol.225
Future disruptions could come from any range of natural
disasters. An earthquake or wildfire is tragedy enough when it
occurs; concentrating such a vital industry as medical
manufacturing in fewer places by offshoring much of the
capability invites secondary tragedies as people perhaps
thousands of miles from the initial disaster are left without

222. Renee Skelton & Vernice Miller, The Environmental Justice Movement,
NRDC (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/environmental-justicemovement.
223. CR CLEAN AIR GROUP, supra note 31.
224. See, e.g., Hannah Ellis-Petersen, India Limits Medicine Exports After
Supplies
Hit
by
Coronavirus,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
4,
2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/04/india-limits-medicineexports-coronavirus-paracetamol-antibiotics
(India);
Angela
Oketch,
Coronavirus: China Drugs Export Ban Sees Costs Shoot Up, DAILY NATION
(Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Coronavirus—China-drugsexport-ban-sees-costs-shoot-up/1056-5478720-14kxl64/index.html
(China);
Associated Press, EU Seeks United Front to Tackle Medical Shortages from
Virus,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
6,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2020/03/06/world/europe/ap-eu-virusoutbreak-europe.html (Germany, Czech Republic).
225. Coronavirus: Drug Shortage Fears as India Limits Exports, BBC NEWS
(Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51731719.
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necessary medical products. It will therefore be advantageous
for the U.S. to develop a long-term solution to the problem, that
increases the odds of sterilization continuing domestically.
CONCLUSION
While undertaken in an attempt to protect the local
population from harm, a number of state actions tightening
regulations on ETO could end up having exactly the opposite
effect. ETO is the most commonly used chemical for sterilizing
medical devices—and currently has no viable replacement.226 A
sudden ban of the use of ETO could cause dangerous shortages
of necessary healthcare materials. Rather than protect the
public, the states’ knee-jerk reaction banning the use of ETO
could end up costing lives. Because of the balkanization of
federal regulatory power, no single agency can consider both the
environmental costs and the healthcare needs associated with
ETO use. This leaves the federal government without any formal
abilities to prevent this potential crisis.
In order to prevent state actions from damaging the supply
of life-saving medical devices, environmental statutes including
the CAA should be amended to more strongly preempt state
actions. Concurrently, states should be given the ability to apply
for a waiver of that preemption, which should be freely granted
unless the state action threatens the public health. Federal
regulation bypasses a number of issues associated with local
control.227 A system where states apply for preemption waivers
that are freely given, but may be retracted, provides a balance of
state and federal interests. States’ powers to set local policy will
remain generally undisturbed, yet federal oversight will prevent
a multitude of local self-interests from creating a national crisis.

226. See Sharpless, supra note 14.
227. See supra Section II.C.

